On 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall, which physically and ideologically divided East and West Germany, crumbled. The peaceful reunification of the two sides marked the culmination of Bonn diplomacy, named for the capital of West Germany from 1949 to 1990. But if September taught European politics a lesson, it was that the vision of an organic unity between East and West Germany has not materialised as easily as once hoped. The gulf that remains is not only characteristic of Germany, but also of the rest of Europe.

At the heart of this division is the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AFD) party and its growing influence in the east of the country in recent elections. This reflects the deepening east-west political and ideological divide, as the party capitalises on regional frustrations, particularly in the former East Germany, where many voters feel neglected by the traditional parties.

“Organic unity between East and West Germany has not materialised as easily as once hoped”

The AFD’s rise, particularly in states like Thuringia and Saxony, suggests that the far right is no longer a marginal force in German politics. Anti-immigration sentiment, opposition to supporting Ukraine, and scepticism towards the EU are becoming central themes in the political landscape, putting pressure on the ruling coalition led by Olaf Scholz. The recent success of the AFD in regional elections, combined with poor outcomes for the ruling coalition parties in earlier state elections and the European Parliament election in June, has thrown the three-party coalition into political turmoil. Governing within this divided coalition is set to become even more challenging. The future of the coalition, as many analysts have pointed out, hinges on the upcoming “autumn of decisions”, which will address critical issues such as migration and the economy.

This growing support is closely tied to the AFD’s stance that the change needs to stop. The party opposes climate change policies, the granting of additional help to Ukraine, and seeks to halt the demographic changes brought about by immigration. A widespread feeling of neglect by the authorities and an economic disadvantage compared to the west have led some people in the east to believe that life was better before reunification. While the ideological, political and cultural differences between these two regions are not surprising given the historical context, they are part of a wider phenomenon of changing political orientations and rising of far-right movements in Europe.

Germany’s far-right resurgence echoes a larger movement of populism that has gained ground in European countries. From France to Italy, via Hungary and Croatia, several EU countries have come close to having hard-right parties in government. For decades, populist or nationalist parties have been kept far from the levers of power, illustrated by the strategy of “cordon sanitaire” or “firewall” in France. The AFD’s success could embolden far-right parties in countries like France (Marine Le Pen’s National Rally), Italy (Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy), and Hungary (Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz). The AFD’s rhetoric on reducing support for Ukraine and challenging EU policies may further contribute to growing fractures within the European Union.

“Should the EU push back against these parties, or accommodate their growing influence?”

A useful metaphor for this phenomenon is the ”snowball effect“— where a small push of social, economic, and political change gradually builds into a larger, unstoppable force. The far-right’s success is not due to any single factor but rather the cumulative result of decades of voter dealignment, strategic modernization by far-right parties, and the shifting media environment. Far-right parties, like Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National in France, have carefully rebranded, distancing themselves from extreme elements while maintaining radical positions on immigration and nationalism.

As these trends continue, the far right’s influence is likely to reshape both German and European politics. With Germany’s coalition government at risk and far-right parties gaining ground across the continent, the political centre may feel pressured to co-opt some of the far-right’s ideas to maintain voter support. For instance, in the eastern state of Thuringia, where the AFD is increasing its local influence, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has joined forces with the far-right party to adopt a tax cut in 2023 in response to voters’ demands. This growing alignment could further erode the traditional consensus on issues like immigration and economic integration within the EU.

The rise of far-right parties across Europe, particularly seen in the AFD’s regional victories in Germany, raises a crucial question for the European Union: should the EU push back against these parties, or should it find ways to accommodate their growing influence? Pushing back against far-right movements could further alienate voters who feel disconnected from the political mainstream and reinforce the populist narrative that the EU is out of touch with ordinary citizens. On the other hand, finding flexibility with these parties could mean incorporating some of their concerns into broader EU policies—particularly on issues like immigration and national sovereignty—without fully endorsing their more extreme views. How the EU chooses to respond will likely shape its future political landscape and its ability to address deep-seated divisions within member states.